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Abstract
We investigate how to attack Shor’s quantum algorithm for factorization with
an entangling probe. We show that an attacker can steal an exact solution of Shor’s
algorithm outside an institute where the quantum computer is installed if he replaces
its initialized quantum register with entangled qubits, namely the entangling probe.
He can apply arbitrary local operations to his own probe. Moreover, we assume that
there is an unauthorized person who helps the attacker to commit a crime inside
the institute. He tells garbage data obtained from measurements of the quantum
register to the attacker secretly behind a legitimate user’s back. If the attacker
succeeds in cracking Shor’s algorithm, the legitimate user obtains a random answer
and does not notice the attacker’s illegal acts. We discuss how to detect the attacker.
Finally we estimate a probability that the quantum algorithm inevitably makes an
error, of which the attacker can take advantage.
1 Introduction
Utilization of entanglement to steal information of the quantum cryptographic protocol in
key distribution has been investigated in several strategies [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In these attacks,
first, Eve (an eavesdropper) lets a carrier qubit of Alic and Bob (a sender and a receiver)
interact with her own qubit, called as a probe, so that the carrier qubit and the probe are
in an entangled state. Next, Eve measures her own probe and obtains information about
the key distribution. In Ref. [1], the general eavesdropping attack with the probe and
its trade-off between the information gain and disturbance are investigated. In Ref. [2],
individual attacks with the probe against the four-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
and the two-state Bennett 1992 (B92) quantum cryptographic protocols are examined
[6, 7]. In Ref. [3], for the interaction of the entangling probe with signal basis states of
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the BB84 protocol, some optimized unitary transformations are calculated. In Ref. [4], it is
discussed how to realize the Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) entangling probe physically using
a deterministic controlled-NOT gate implemented with single-photon two-qubit (SPTQ)
quantum logic. In Ref. [5], physical simulation of the FPB probe with the SPTQ logic is
discussed, including physical errors. Moreover, as an advanced version, Eve can let her
probe interact with more than one of Alice and Bob’s qubits simultaneously, which is called
as a coherent attack [8]. In Ref. [9], Eve’s optimal information gained in coherent attacks
is estimated for the six-state protocol, which is another version of the BB84 protocol and
discussed in Ref. [10]. It is considered that coherent measurements can supply much more
information than incoherent individual measurements can do [11]. Because Eve can steal
information from quantum cryptographic protocols with entangling probes as mentioned
above, we may expect to do exactly same for attacking quantum algorithms. This is the
primary motivation of the current paper.
In this paper, we examine what kind of security incidents arise if the attacker replaces
initialized qubits of the quantum register of the quantum computer with entangled qubits,
that is to say the entangling probe, for Shor’s factoring algorithm [12, 13]. We formulate
circumstances where the attacker commits illegal acts as follows. We assume that the
quantum computer is installed in a research institute and connected to external quantum
networks located outside the institute. We assume that the attacker can replace the qubits
in the initial state belonging to the quantum register of the quantum computer with the
entangled ones via the networks. Thus, the attacker shares entanglement between the
qubits of the quantum register and the qubits that he holds. The attacker can apply
local operations, for example, arbitrary unitary transformations and measurements, to
his own qubits. Moreover, we assume that there is an unauthorized person who helps
the attacker to commit illegal acts harming the quantum algorithm inside the institute.
The accomplice tells garbage data obtained as results of measurements of the quantum
register to the attacker outside the institute secretly behind a legitimate user’s back.
We assume that the attacker wants to achieve the following two goals. The first one
is to steal an exact solution of the quantum algorithm that the legitimate user performs.
The second one is to let the legitimate user not notice the attacker’s illegal acts. In
addition, we attach a condition to the attacker’s plan of the malicious acts. During the
sequence of the illegal acts, the accomplice does not obtain any information about the
exact solution of the quantum algorithm.
First of all, we discuss how to attack Simon’s algorithm [14, 15]. Next, we consider how
to attack Shor’s factoring algorithm. This is because Shor’s algorithm is based on Simon’s
algorithm and the quantum discrete Fourier transform [16]. Furthermore, we discuss how
to detect the attacker’s illegal acts. Finally, we both numerically and analytically estimate
a probability that Shor’s algorithm inevitably makes an error, of which the attacker can
take advantage. The probability that Shor’s algorithm fails is approximately equal to
0.2263.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give a brief review of Simon’s algo-
rithm. In Sec. 3, we give a brief review of Shor’s algorithm for factorization. In Sec. 4,
we consider how to attack Simon’s algorithm. In Sec. 5, we consider how to attack Shor’s
algorithm for factorization. In Sec. 6, we evaluate a probability that Shor’s algorithm
outputs a wrong answer. The attacker makes use of this chance for committing a crime.
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In Sec. 7, we give a brief discussion.
2 A brief review of Simon’s algorithm
In this section, we give a brief review of Simon’s algorithm [14, 15]. It solves the following
problem efficiently. We consider an unknown Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for
some integer n. We assume that the function f satisfies one of the next two conditions.
• All {f(x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} are different and the function f is one-to-one.
• There exists a certain nontrivial value s ∈ {0, 1}n where s 6= 0, and the statement
“f(x) = f(y)⇔ x = y or x = y⊕ s” holds true. Thus, the function f is two-to-one.
We want to distinguish between the above two cases with the fewest evaluations of f
possible. If the latter case holds, we also want to obtain s.
Simon’s algorithm is given as follows. We prepare two n-qubit registers A and B. As
an operation of evaluating the function f , we introduce a unitary gate Uf ,
|x〉A|y〉B Uf−→ |x〉A|y ⊕ f(x)〉B, (1)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. We define the Hadamard transformation for one qubit as
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (2)
where we use an orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉} for the matrix representation. Moreover, we
introduce the following notations. ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we define x⊕ y = (x1 + y1 mod 2, x2 +
y2 mod 2, ..., xn + yn mod 2) and x · y = ∑ni=1 xiyi mod 2.
First, we initialize the quantum registers A and B in the following state:
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉A|0〉B. (3)
Second, we apply the unitary gate Uf defined in Eq. (1) to the above state and obtain
Uf−→ 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉A|f(x)〉B. (4)
Third, we apply the Hadamard transformation to each qubit of the quantum register A,
H⊗n−→ 1
2n
∑
x,y∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉A|f(x)〉B. (5)
Fourth, we observe the quantum register A and obtain y = k1. Repeating similar opera-
tions m times, we obtain k1, k2, ..., km, where m is of order O(n).
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We consider a finite set of equations,
k1 · s = 0 mod 2,
k2 · s = 0 mod 2,
...
km · s = 0 mod 2. (6)
If we find nontrivial s( 6= 0) that satisfies the above system of equations, the function f is
two-to-one. Otherwise, for s = 0, it is one-to-one.
The reason why the facts mentioned above hold is as follows. If the function f is
one-to-one, Prob(k), a probability that we obtain k1 = k, is given by
Prob(k) =
1
2n
∀k ∈ {0, 1}n. (7)
Contrastingly, if the function f is two-to-one, it is given by
Prob(k) =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
1
22n
|(−1)x·k + (−1)(x⊕s)·k|2
=
{
1/2n−1 k · s = 0 mod 2,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Thus, we obtain Eq. (6).
3 A brief review of Shor’s algorithm for factorization
In this section, we give a brief review of Shor’s algorithm for factorization [12, 13]. We let
N is an odd composite integer. Throughout this paper, we assume N ≫ 1. To factorize
large N efficiently, Shor’s algorithm solves the following equivalent problem. We choose
an integer y at random, where y is coprime to N [gcd(y,N) = 1] and 2 ≤ y ≤ N − 1.
Then, we define a function,
FN(a) ≡ ya mod N. (9)
Shor’s algorithm finds a period r of FN(a) with polynomial time in logN . If r is even
and yr/2 6≡ ±1 mod N , gcd(yr/2 ± 1, N) is a nontrivial factor of N . A probability that y
is odd or yr/2 ≡ ±1 mod N is low enough for efficient computation.
We can regard Shor’s algorithm as an combination of Simon’s algorithm and the
discrete Fourier transform. To obtain the period r of FN(a) efficiently, we carry out a
process described below. First, we choose an integer q = 2L as a power of two, where
N2 ≤ q ≤ 2N2. Then, we initialize the quantum registers A and B in the following state:
1√
q
q−1∑
a=0
|a〉A|0〉B. (10)
Second, we compute FN(a) given by Eq. (9) and write down its output on the quantum
register B,
1√
q
q−1∑
a=0
|a〉A|ya mod N〉B. (11)
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Third, we observe the quantum register B. We suppose that we obtain z ≡ yl mod N
for some least l. Then, the quantum register A irreversibly reduces to the following state:
|φl〉A = 1√
A + 1
A∑
j=0
|jr + l〉A, (12)
where A is given by
A = ⌊(q − l)/r⌋. (13)
We rewrite Eq. (12) in the form,
|φl〉A =
q−1∑
a=0
f(a)|a〉A, (14)
f(a) =
{
1/
√
A + 1 for a = jr + l, j = 0, 1, ..., A,
0 otherwise.
(15)
Fourth, we apply the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to the quantum register A
given by Eq. (14) and obtain
DFTq|φl〉A =
q−1∑
c=0
f˜(c)|c〉A, (16)
f˜(c) =
1√
q
q−1∑
a=0
exp(2piiac/q)f(a). (17)
Fifth, we observe the quantum register A. We suppose that we obtain c with the mea-
surement. We consider values of c which satisfy the following inequality:
−r
2
≤ rc mod q ≤ r
2
. (18)
The number of values of c mod q that satisfy Eq. (18) is r. We can observe each value of
c that satisfies Eq. (18) at least with a probability of (4/pi2)(1/r). Thus, we can observe c
that satisfies Eq. (18) at least with a total probability of 4/pi2 ≃ 0.405. To put it the other
way around, we can observe c that does not satisfy Eq. (18) at most with a probability
of 1− (4/pi2) ≃ 0.595.
In the simplified situation where r divides q exactly, we can observe c satisfying Eq. (18)
with a zero error probability. (If r divides q exactly, there are r values of c that satisfy
rc mod q = 0.) Otherwise, the operation mentioned above certainly makes an error, that
is to say supplies c not satisfying Eq. (18), with a non-zero probability. In Sec. 6, we
evaluate this probability both numerically and analytically.
If Eq. (18) holds, there is only one value of c′ that satisfies
|rc− c′q| ≤ r
2
, (19)
where 0 ≤ c′ ≤ r − 1. Then, c′/r is a convergent of the continued fraction of c/q. If
gcd(c′, r) = 1, that is to say c′ is coprime to r, we obtain r. The number of values of
c′ that satisfy gcd(c′, r) = 1 is given by φ(r), Euler’s Phi function. Thus, a probability
that we choose c′ satisfying gcd(c′, r) = 1 is given by φ(r)/r. According to Ref. [17], the
average order of φ(r) is given by 6r/pi2, and we obtain φ(r)/r ≃ 6/pi2 ≃ 0.608. Or, in
other words, we cannot obtain r with a probability of 0.392 around.
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4 How to attack Simon’s algorithm
In this section, we discuss how to attack Simon’s algorithm. First of all, we assume that
the number of qubits in the quantum register A, namely n, is publicly disclosed, so that
the attacker knows it. We consider the case where the attacker replaces the qubits of the
register A with the entangled ones that keep entanglement between quantum registers A
and C. We assume that the quantum register C is an n-qubit system the attacker holds.
The attacker prepares the following state instead of Eq. (3):
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉A|x〉C|0〉B. (20)
To generate the above state, the attacker has only to replace the ith qubit of the register
A with the maximally entangled state,
|Φ(+)〉AiCi = (1/
√
2)(|0〉Ai|0〉Ci + |1〉Ai|1〉Ci) for i = 1, ..., n. (21)
The legitimate user applies the unitary gate Uf defined in Eq. (1) to the quantum
registers A and B in Eq. (20) and we obtain
Uf−→ 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉A|x〉C|f(x)〉B. (22)
Next, the legitimate user and the attacker apply the Hadamard transformation to each
qubit of the quantum registers A and C, respectively and independently. Then, we obtain
the state of the whole system as
H⊗n
A
⊗H⊗n
C−→ 1
23n/2
∑
x,y,z∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·(y⊕z)|y〉A|z〉C|f(x)〉B. (23)
We suppose that results of the measurements of the quantum registers A and C are given
by y = k1 and z = j1, respectively. We repeat similar operations for m times and obtain
k1, k2, ..., km and j1, j2, ..., jm.
Here, we think about the following finite set of equations:
(k1 ⊕ j1) · s = 0 mod 2,
(k2 ⊕ j2) · s = 0 mod 2,
...
(km ⊕ jm) · s = 0 mod 2. (24)
If we find nontrivial s( 6= 0) that satisfies the above system of equations, the function f is
two-to-one. Otherwise, for s = 0, it is one-to-one.
We consider the following scenario for attacking the quantum computer. Before the
legitimate user performs Simon’s algorithm, the attacker replaces the qubits of the quan-
tum register A with the entangled ones as mentioned above. The legitimate user obtains
random integers {k1, ..., km}.
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Under these circumstances, the legitimate user cannot detect the attacker’s illegal
acts. The reason is as follows. Because the legitimate user obtains the random integers
{k1, ..., km}, the solution of Eq. (6) is given by s = 0. In other words, if the legitimate
user observes plenty of the random integers {k1, ..., km}, they force him to obtain s = 0
as the solution of Eq. (6). Thus, he has to accept a conclusion that f is one-to-one. Even
for such a large m, m ∼ O(n) holds.
If the legitimate user once obtains s = 0, he cannot confirm whether or not it is a
correct answer practically. This is because he has to find two different numbers x and
x ⊕ s such that f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) for s 6= 0 among 2n integers for proving that s = 0 is
wrong. ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, there exists at most only one y( 6= x) that satisfies f(x) = f(y).
Thus, it is practically impossible to find a pair of integers (x, y) such that f(x) = f(y)
for x 6= y. Hence, the legitimate user cannot detect the attacker’s illegal acts.
Here, we pay attention to the following fact. When we specify the problem at first,
we assume that the function f can be either one-to-one or two-to-one. However, if the
legitimate user knows f to be two-to-one beforehand, he cannot obtain s = 0 as an answer
and he can conclude that it is evidence of attacker’s illegal acts.
In Simon’s algorithm, the legitimate user obtains a set of random integers {k1, ..., km}
from the measurements for the one-to-one function f even if the attacker does not perform
malicious acts. Here, we make the following assumptions. If the legitimate user obtains
s 6= 0, he keeps {k1, ..., km} in a safe place carefully. By contrast, if he obtains s = 0 and
notices that {k1, ..., km} is a set of random integers, he regards it as garbage data, treat
it carelessly, and does not keep it secret. In case the attacker disturbs the process of the
algorithm and the legitimate user obtains a set of random integers {k1, ..., km}, we also
assume that it is regarded as garbage data and not kept in a safe place.
Then, the accomplice tells {k1, ..., km} to the attacker secretly behind a legitimate
users’s back. The attacker eventually obtains correct s from Eq. (24) for two-to-one f
because he obtains {k1⊕j1, ..., km⊕jm}. Because {k1, ..., km} is a set of random integers for
the accomplice during this sequence of illegal acts, he cannot obtain any information about
the exact solution s at all. Hence, the attacker succeeds in cracking Simon’s algorithm.
At the close of this section, we consider a method of detecting the attacker’s illegal
acts. If the legitimate user secretly runs an instance with a known two-to-one function
f and nontrivial s( 6= 0), he can promptly notice the attacker’s malicious acts because of
the random integers {k1, ..., km} observed on the quantum register A and their conclusion
s = 0. We can apply a similar detection method to Shor’s factoring algorithm. It is
discussed in Sec. 5.
5 How to attack Shor’s factoring algorithm
In this section, we discuss how to attack Shor’s factoring algorithm. First of all, we assume
that the composite number N and the randomly chosen number y in Eq. (9) are publicly
disclosed, and the attacker knows them. As explained in Sec. 4, the attacker replaces
the qubits of the register A with the entangled ones that keep entanglement between
quantum registers A and C. We assume that the attacker holds the quantum register C.
Replacing the qubits of the quantum register A with entangled ones, the attacker prepares
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the following state instead of Eq. (10):
1√
q
q−1∑
a=0
|a〉A|a〉C|0〉B. (25)
The legitimate user computes FN (a) given by Eq. (9) and writes down its output on the
quantum register B as
1√
q
q−1∑
a=0
|a〉A|a〉C|ya mod N〉B. (26)
Next, the legitimate user observes the quantum register B, so that the quantum reg-
isters A and C irreversibly reduce to the following state instead of Eqs. (12), (13), (14),
and (15):
1√
A+ 1
A∑
j=0
|jr + l〉A|jr + l〉C
=
q−1∑
a=0
f(a)|a〉A|a〉C. (27)
Then, the legitimate user and the attacker apply the discrete Fourier transform to the
quantum registers A and C, respectively and independently, and we obtain
1
q
q−1∑
a=0
q−1∑
c=0
q−1∑
d=0
exp[2piia(c + d)/q]f(a)|c〉A|d〉C. (28)
If the legitimate user observes the quantum register A, he obtains c such that 0 ≤ c ≤
q−1 at random, and he cannot detect the attacker’s illegal acts. The reason is as follows.
Even if the legitimate user performs Shor’s algorithm properly without disturbance of the
attacker, a probability that he observes c not satisfying Eq. (18) is equal to or less than
0.595 as mentioned in Sec. 3.
For the special situation where a period r divides q exactly, the legitimate user observes
c satisfying Eq. (18) certainly. Otherwise, he observes c not satisfying Eq. (18) with a
non-zero probability. We estimate this probability in Sec. 6 numerically and analytically.
We find that it is approximately equal to 0.2263.
Because of the above reason, even if the legitimate user obtains a wrong period r, he
cannot insist that the attacker commits a crime. Now, we assume the following. If the
legitimate user obtains a wrong period r, he regards c, the result of the measurement of
the quantum register A, as garbage data and does not keep it in a safe place carefully.
Then, we assume that the accomplice tells c to the attacker secretly behind a legitimate
user’s back. From a measurement of the quantum register C, the attacker obtains c + d,
and he may eventually obtain a correct period r.
Here, we examine how to detect the attacker’s illegal acts. The legitimate user can
secretly run an instance with a known period r. For example, if the legitimate user tries to
solve a problem where r divides q exactly, he has to observe c = λq/r for λ = 0, 1, ..., r−1
for the quantum register A with a zero error probability. Thus, he promptly notices the
attacker’s malicious acts. The legitimate user can compute a mod r instead of FN(a)
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given by Eq. (9). Clearly, the function a mod r has a period r. If the legitimate user
performs this detection method with a certain frequency, he can notice the attacker’s
interference. We pay attention to the fact that to prepare FN (a) with the known period
r is very difficult because of a huge amount of calculations.
At the close of this section, we consider the following. The legitimate user discloses
the composite number N and the randomly chosen number y in Eq. (9). Thus, someone
may insist that the attacker had better run Shor’s algorithm by himself instead of attack-
ing the legitimate user’s quantum computer. However, cracking other person’s quantum
computer, the attacker can execute Shor’s algorithm without preparing a quantum circuit
which computes FN(a) defined in Eq. (9). In the process of the attack explained in this
section, the attacker only needs the entangling probe and the quantum Fourier transform.
This is merit for committing the illegal acts.
6 Numerical and analytical evaluations of the prob-
ability of obtaining c that does not satisfy Eq. (18)
It is mentioned in Sec. 3 that the probability of obtaining c that does not satisfy Eq. (18)
for the measurement of the quantum register A is equal to or less than 0.595. In this
section, we evaluate the probability numerically and analytically. Throughout this section,
we assume that the period r does not divide q exactly.
First, we estimate the probability numerically for concrete examples. For example, we
consider N = 3 × 7 = 21. According to Sec. 3, we take L = 9 and q = 2L = 512. We
choose y = 2 for Eq. (9) and obtain a period r = 6. Taking l = 0 for Eq. (12), we obtain
A = 85 for Eq. (13). The number of values of c satisfying Eq. (18) is given by six and
we define a set of them as S = {0, 85, 171, 256, 341, 427}. The probability that we obtain
c with the measurement of the quantum register A can be written as Prob(c) = |f˜(c)|2,
where f˜(c) is given by Eq. (17). The probability of obtaining c that does not satisfy
Eq. (18) is given as follows:
P = 1−∑
c∈S
Prob(c). (29)
From numerical calculations, we obtain P ≃ 0.2074.
We show probability distribution of Prob(c) for c ∈ {0, 1, ..., 511} for r = 6 and l = 0
in Figs. 1 and 2. In Figs. 1 and 2, Prob(c) is represented in linear and logarithmic scales,
respectively. Looking at Fig. 2, we notice that Prob(c) is larger than 10−5 at many values
of c. Thus, we can expect to observe random c with a certain probability larger than 10−5
around.
In Table 1, we show numerical evaluations of P defined in Eq. (29) for various com-
posite numbers N . Turning our eyes to Table 1, we notice that the probability of Eq. (29)
approaches P ≃ 0.2263 as N becomes larger. This fact implies that we can find an exact
period r with a probability of 1 − P ≃ 0.7737 in Shor’s algorithm. The average number
of trials for obtaining the exact r is around n¯ = 1/(1− P ) ≃ 1.292. Because its standard
deviation as the Poisson distribution is given by
√
n¯ ≃ 1.137, the attacker can try illegal
operation 1.137 times per n¯ ≃ 1.292 proper operations. Thus, the expectation number
of total trials for one illegal operation is given by (n¯ +
√
n¯)/
√
n¯ ≃ 2.136. Hence, the
9
0 128 256 384 511
c
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
ProbHcL
Figure 1: A graph of probability distribution of Prob(c) for c ∈ {0, 1, ..., 511} for r = 6
and l = 0. A linear scale is used for the vertical axis.
0 128 256 384 511
c
10-7
10-5
0.001
0.1
ProbHcL
Figure 2: A graph of probability distribution of Prob(c) for c ∈ {0, 1, ..., 511} for r = 6
and l = 0. A logarithmic scale is used for the vertical axis. At many values of c, Prob(c)
is larger than 10−5 around.
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Table 1: Numerical evaluations of P defined in Eq. (29) for various composite numbers
N . We suppose l = 0 for Eqs. (12) and (13) throughout all instances shown in this table.
The period r for the function FN(a) ≡ ya mod N in Eq. (9) is always a divisor of φ(N).
The probability P approaches P ≃ 0.2263 as N becomes larger.
N L φ(N) y r A P
3× 7 = 21 9 12 2 6 85 0.2074
3× 11 = 33 11 20 2 10 204 0.2204
5× 7 = 35 11 24 2 12 170 0.2099
5× 11 = 55 12 40 2 20 204 0.2204
7× 11 = 77 13 60 2 30 273 0.2243
7× 17 = 119 14 96 3 48 341 0.2099
11× 13 = 143 15 120 2 60 546 0.2251
11× 17 = 187 16 160 3 80 819 0.2204
13× 17 = 221 16 192 3 48 1365 0.2105
13× 19 = 247 16 216 2 36 1820 0.2245
17× 19 = 323 17 288 3 144 910 0.2243
17× 23 = 391 18 352 3 176 1489 0.2250
19× 23 = 437 18 396 2 198 1323 0.2263
19× 29 = 551 19 504 2 252 2080 0.2262
23× 29 = 667 19 616 2 308 1702 0.2261
23× 31 = 713 19 660 3 330 1588 0.2262
29× 31 = 899 20 840 3 420 2496 0.2262
29× 37 = 1073 21 1008 2 252 8322 0.2262
31× 37 = 1147 21 1080 2 180 11650 0.2262
31× 41 = 1271 21 1200 3 120 17476 0.2257
37× 41 = 1517 22 1440 2 180 23301 0.2262
37× 41 = 1517 22 1440 16 45 93206 0.2262
37× 43 = 1591 22 1512 2 252 16644 0.2262
37× 43 = 1591 22 1512 9 63 66576 0.2263
41× 43 = 1763 22 1680 5 420 9986 0.2263
41× 43 = 1763 22 1680 10 105 39945 0.2263
41× 47 = 1927 22 1840 6 920 4559 0.2262
41× 47 = 1927 22 1840 16 115 36472 0.2263
43× 47 = 2021 22 1932 3 966 4341 0.2263
43× 47 = 2021 22 1932 4 161 26051 0.2263
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attacker can perform the illegal operation once every 2.136 operations at most or with a
probability less than
√
n¯/(n¯+
√
n¯) ≃ 0.4681.
Second, we estimate the probability analytically. Because we take N ≫ 1 and N2 ≤
q ≤ 2N2 and r < N holds, we can assume r ≪ q. Thus, we can suppose A+1 ≃ q/r with
neglecting a small roundoff error. From Eqs. (15), (16), and (17) and Prob(c) = |f˜(c)|2,
we obtain
Prob(c) ≃ r
q2
|
q/r−1∑
j=0
exp(ijθc)|2
=
r
q2
∣∣∣∣∣1− exp(iqθc/r)1− exp(iθc)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
r
q2
sin2[qθc/(2r)]
sin2(θc/2)
, (30)
where
θc =
2pi
q
(rc mod q). (31)
In the derivation of Eq. (30), we neglect a factor exp(2piilc/q) because it does not depend
on j and its absolute value is equal to unity.
We let x = rc mod q. Then, because of Eq. (18) and its related explanation mentioned
in Sec. 3, the number of values of x that exist in an interval [−r/2, r/2] is equal to r. Here,
we assume that these values of x are distributed in the interval [−r/2, r/2] uniformly and
we can replace the summation
∑
c∈S with an integral
∫ r/2
−r/2 dx in Eq. (29). Thus, we obtain
P ≃ 1− 2
∫ r/2
0
r
q2
sin2(pix/r)
sin2(pix/q)
dx. (32)
[In the case where r divides q exactly, rc mod q = 0 always holds for c satisfying Eq. (18),
so that the values of x are not distributed in the interval [−r/2, r/2] uniformly.]
Because 0 ≤ x ≤ r/2, r ≪ q, and pix/q ≪ 1, we have an approximation sin2(pix/q) ≃
(pix/q)2. Then, we can calculate P in Eq. (32) as follows:
P ≃ 1− 2r
q2
∫ r/2
0
sin2(pix/r)
(pix/q)2
dx
= 1− 2
pi2
[−2 + piSi(pi)]
≃ 0.226 305, (33)
where
Si(x) =
∫ x
0
sin t
t
dt. (34)
This analytical result corresponds well to the numerical one obtained above.
12
7 Discussion
In this paper, we examine how to attack Simon’s algorithm and Shor’s factoring algorithm
with entangling probes. The attacks are performed in two stages. At the first stage, the
attacker replaces the qubits of the quantum register with entangled ones. At the second
stage, the accomplice tells results of measurements of the quantum register as classical
information to the attacker secretly. To succeed in cracking the quantum algorithms, the
attacker needs both quantum entanglement and classical information. The situation looks
like that of the quantum teleportation [18]. In the scenario of the quantum teleportation,
Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled state first and Alice sends a result of a
measurement of qubits to Bob as classical information second.
In Secs. 4 and 5, we discuss methods of detecting the attacker’s disturbance. Because
the attacker can commit a crime once every 2.136 operations at most or with a probability
less than 0.4681 for Shor’s algorithm, the legitimate user has to carry out the detection
test once every two operations around. This is a cumbersome procedure for the legitimate
user.
To protect the quantum computer against the attacks proposed in this paper, we have
to take care of the following three points. First, we have to keep the initial state of
the quantum register intact and sound. We do not let it be entangled with a quantum
system outside the institute. Second, we have to keep the garbage data secret and erase it
completely. Third, we have to exclude the accomplice in the cracking from the institute.
Initializing the memory certainly, treating the garbage data properly, and guarding the
system from an inside job. These are key components of computer security in general.
From a viewpoint of the prevention of security incidents, there is no difference between
the classical and quantum computers.
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